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Recent research has shown that relaxing the assumptions of complete information
and common knowledge in exchange rate models can shed light on a wide range of
important exchange rate puzzles. In this chapter, we review a number of models we
have developed in previous work that relax the strong assumptions on information.
We also review some related literature.
JEL: F31, F37, F47
Keywords: information heterogeneity, learning, infrequent decisions1 Introduction
Most models of exchange rate determination make a set of heroic assumptions
about the information under which investors operate in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. In particular, investors are assumed to: i) have identical information; ii)
perfectly know the model; iii) use all available information at all times. These as-
sumptions are typical in macroeconomics and are technically convenient. However,
recent research has shown that these abstractions about the information structure
have crucial implications and that relaxing them can shed light on a wide range of
important exchange rate puzzles. In this chapter we review a number of models
that we have developed in previous work to relax these restrictive assumptions on
information. We also review some related literature.
It is not di￿cult to argue that the \benchmark" information structure com-
monly used in models of exchange rate determination bears little resemblance to
reality. The assumption of common information held by all investors is inconsis-
tent with various observations. First, there is an enormous volume of trade in
the FX market (larger than in any other ￿nancial market), re￿ecting di￿erences
among investors. Second, investors have di￿erent expectations about future macro
variables like GDP and prices as well as future exchange rates themselves. Third,
the close link between exchange rates and order ￿ow, ￿rst documented by Evans
and Lyons (2002), suggests that the exchange rate primarily aggregates private as
1opposed to public information.
That investors perfectly know the model is also a radical simpli￿cation from
reality. There exists a considerable amount of uncertainty about the model and
about structural parameters. This implies a learning process by investors, which
a￿ects their behavior. It also makes policy, especially monetary policy, more dif-
￿cult. A substantial literature has documented parameter instability in macro-
economic data, while another literature has investigated the implications of model
uncertainty for monetary policy. There is also widespread evidence of parameter
instability in ￿nancial data (see Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for a survey), including
exchange rates (e.g. Rossi (2006)).
Finally, the assumption that everyone uses all available information at all times
ignores the cost of continuous information processing. There are two ways in which
information processing is limited. First, as we will discuss later on, most ￿nancial
institutions and individual investors do not actively manage the FX exposure of
external claims. They do not continuously adjust their foreign exchange holdings
based on all available information as it is costly to do so. Second, even when they
do change their portfolios, decisions are usually made on the basis of only a limited
set of information. The best known example of this behavior is the carry trade,
which may be conditioned only on interest rate di￿erentials.
Through some simple examples we will illustrate that relaxing these restrictive
2assumptions about the information structure allows us to shed light on some of the
biggest puzzles related to exchange rates, such as the disconnect between exchange
rates and macro fundamentals and the forward discount puzzle. Our strategy is
to start from a standard exchange rate model, the monetary model, and introduce
various types of incomplete information. We consider only small deviations from
the benchmark case, so that investors still use what they know about the model’s
structure to form their expectations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start
by discussing a standard \benchmark" monetary model of exchange rate determi-
nation that makes the usual set of restrictive assumptions about the information
structure. The subsequent three sections relax some of these assumptions, one
at a time. In Section 3 we allow for information heterogeneity across investors.
In Section 4 we introduce model uncertainty in the form of time-varying struc-
tural parameters that are unknown. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss what happens
when investors do not continuously process all available information. Section 6
concludes.
2 Basic Monetary Model
The simplest dynamic model of exchange rate determination is the monetary
model. We examine the impact of incomplete information within a two-country
3version of this standard framework. The model is described by the following four
equations:












t + st (3)
Et(st+1 ￿ st) = it ￿ i
￿
t +  t (4)
Equation (1) is a standard money market equilibrium equation, with mt the log
money supply, pt the log price level, yt the log output level and it the interest rate.
(2) is the analogous equation for the Foreign country.1 (3) is a purchasing power
parity equation and (4) is an interest rate parity equation.  t is the deviation from
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP).
Substituting (1)-(3) into (4) we obtain a ￿rst-order di￿erence equation with a
familiar solution:

















1This traditional money market equilibrium can easily be replaced by an interest rate rule,
which is more typical in DSGE models. Equation (1) can be written as it = ￿0 + ￿1(pt ￿
p) + ￿2(yt ￿ y) + ￿3(mt ￿ ￿ m). Often other variables appear in interest rate rules, such as the
current or expected in￿ation rate, but this does not fundamentally change the speci￿cation. It
just involves replacing one fundamental variable in the interest rate rule, such as mt ￿ ￿ m, with
another fundamental, such as ￿t ￿ ￿ ￿, where ￿t is the in￿ation rate.
4where ft = mt ￿ m￿
t ￿ ￿(yt ￿ y￿
t) and ￿ = ￿=(1 + ￿).
With full information, expectations can be computed from the known process
for the fundamental ft and the UIP deviation  t. For example, when they follow






1 ￿ ￿￿ 
 t (6)
In this case the exchange rate is directly linked to the observed macro fundamentals
ft and  t.
The implicit assumption behind (6) is that investors have no information about
future fundamental shocks. However, the solution is very similar when agents
receive public signals about future fundamentals, such as public news variables
that are featured in the literature on the impact of news shocks.2 For example,
let vt = ft+1 + ￿t be a piece of public information about ft+1, where the variance
of ￿t+1 is ￿2
v. Together with the signal ft+1 = ￿fft +￿
f
t+1, signal extraction implies
Et+1ft+1 = a1ft+a2vt, where a1 = ￿f=(￿2
fd), a2 = 1=(￿2
vd) and d = (1=￿2
v)+(1=￿2
f).
Since Etft+j = ￿
j￿1
f Etft+1 for j > 1, we then have
st = (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿(a1 ￿ ￿f)
1 ￿ ￿￿f





1 ￿ ￿￿ 
 t (7)
The exchange rate depends again on a set of publicly observed variables, with vt
now added to the list.
2See for examples Beaudry and Portier (2006), Devereux and Engel (2006), Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2008) and Lorenzoni (2010).
5This model contains all restrictive assumptions about the information structure
alluded to in the introduction. All agents have the same public information. They
all know the model. The parameters of the model are constant and known. Finally,
all agents continuously adjust their portfolio based on all available information.
This latter assumption is generally made in rational expectation dynamic portfolio
choice models. In these models, the expected excess return on Foreign bonds (the
UIP deviation) is then equal to a risk premium.
The model has many implications that are at odds with the data. First, it
implies that the exchange rate is exclusively determined by public information.
This stands in sharp contrast to the widespread evidence of a disconnect between
exchange rates and observed macro variables. The best illustration of this dis-
connect is the well-known Meese-Rogo￿ puzzle. Meese and Rogo￿ (1983) tried to
explain exchange rate movements with observed macroeconomic fundamentals and
found that a fundamental-based model cannot outperform a random walk.3 Their
￿ndings imply that the limited explanatory power of observed macro fundamentals
3More precisely, Meese and Rogo￿ (1983) estimate a linear exchange-rate model based on
standard fundamentals like money supply, output and interest rates. They use the estimated
model to do a one-period ahead forecast, but use the actual future fundamental (which implies
this is not a true forecast). They do this for several periods using rolling regressions and compute
the RMSE. They do the same exercise by predicting the exchange rate with a random walk.
The RMSE for the random walk model is generally lower than that for the model based on
fundamentals.
6is dominated by small sample estimation errors of reduced form parameters. This
generates an even weaker ￿t than not using any macro fundamentals at all, as in
the random walk model.
Notice that the puzzle here is not why the exchange rate is a random walk.
Engel and West (2005) have shown that the benchmark model above can generate
near-random walk behavior when the discount rate ￿ is close to 1 and the fun-
damental is an I(1) variable. The puzzle, rather, is the very limited explanatory
power of observed macro fundamentals. Even when the discount rate is close to 1,
and the exchange rate is close to a random walk, in standard models changes in the
exchange rate are fully determined by changes in observed macro fundamentals.
The model also implies a stable relationship between exchange rates and funda-
mentals. As we discuss later on, there is plenty of evidence that this relationship is
highly unstable. It is for this very reason that Meese and Rogo￿ (1983) conducted
rolling regressions to re-estimate model parameters each month.
Finally, the model su￿ers from the well-known forward discount puzzle for
standard justi￿cations of the UIP deviation  t. This is most clear when we set  t
equal to zero. (4) then implies that high interest rate currencies tend to depreciate,
while in reality the evidence consistently shows that they tend to appreciate. The
puzzle can potentially be explained when  t is a time-varying risk premium, as in
standard models where agents continuously adjust their portfolio. But so far the
7quest for such a model matching the data has remained unsuccessful.4
We now turn to generalizations of the simple information structure above and
discuss how they can generate a better ￿t to the data.
3 Information Heterogeneity
The ￿rst deviation from the benchmark we consider is information heterogeneity as
analyzed in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). There is symmetric information
dispersion in the sense that agents have private signals, but no agent has superior
information. There are two types of information heterogeneity. First, agents have
private information about the future level of the fundamental. Second, agents
have private trading needs that are only known to themselves and are unrelated to
expectations about the future fundamental. Examples of this are private liquidity
needs or hedging needs or private investment opportunities. This leads to a source
of demand or supply of Foreign bonds that is unrelated to expected returns and is
unobservable in the aggregate.
The main implication of having private information about future fundamentals
4See surveys by Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996). Burnside et al. (2011) ￿nd that there is very
little connection between excess returns on currency strategies and a wide range of possible risk
factors. Verdelhan (2010) has had some success based on a model with habit formation, but
his explanation relies on the close link between consumption and real exchange rates that is not
observed in the data.
8is that the exchange rate becomes a source of information. Since the exchange
rate re￿ects demand or supply from heterogenous agents, it aggregates information
about future fundamentals. However, the exchange rate is still a noisy signal, as in
the noisy rational expectation literature, because of the unrelated private trading
needs.
These two types of information heterogeneity lead to three changes to the
model (1)-(4). First, the UIP deviation  t is equal to a risk premium. The \non-
speculative" liquidity or hedging needs are unrelated to expected returns and rep-
resent a separate source of risk. This risk premium is unobserved as it depends
on the aggregate net supply of Foreign bonds associated with liquidity or hedge
trade. While agents know their own liquidity or hedge trade, they cannot observe
it at the aggregate .
The second change is that the expectation Etst+1 now needs to be replaced
by the average expectation ￿ Etst+1 across all agents. We assume that there is a
continuum of agents on the interval [0,1]. Finally, agents receive a private signal
about future fundamentals. For simplicity we assume that agents receive a private
signal about the fundamental next period. Agent i receives the signal vi
t = ft+1 +
￿
v;i
t , where the signal error ￿
v;i
t has a N(0;￿2
v) distribution.5
5When private signals provide information about fundamentals further in the future, this
gives rise to higher order expectations, as shown in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) (see also
Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2008).
9In addition we make the simplifying assumptions that  t is i.i.d. with variance
￿2
  and that ft follows a random walk: ft+1 = ft +￿
f




Substituting (1)-(3) into (4), we have
st = ￿ ￿ Etst+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)ft ￿ ￿ t (8)
The model is solved in three steps. First, conjecture a solution
st = (1 ￿ ￿f)ft + ￿fft+1 ￿ ￿  t (9)
Second, for each investor compute the expectation of ft+1. This is done by solving a
standard signal extraction problem using three sources of information: the random
walk process ft+1 = ft + ￿
f
t+1, which is public information, the private signal, and
the exchange rate equation. The exchange rate signal is (st ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)ft)=￿f =





t + ￿s(st ￿ (1 ￿ ￿f)ft)=￿f
D
(10)
where ￿f = 1=￿2
f, ￿v = 1=￿2
v, ￿s = ￿2
f=(￿2
 ￿2
 ), and D = ￿f + ￿v + ￿s. Finally,
we use this result to compute the expectation of st+1. Using (9) and aggregating
over agents, ￿ Etst+1 becomes a linear expression in ft, ft+1 and st . Substituting
the result into (8), we can then solve for the unknown parameters ￿f and ￿ .
This last step gives two equations in the unknowns ￿f and ￿ , with ￿f > 0 and
￿  > ￿. We can compare this solution to that of the public information model in
10which there is no information heterogeneity. In that case the solution is (6) with
￿f = 1 and ￿  = 0, so that ￿f = 0 and ￿  = ￿.
Information heterogeneity therefore impacts the exchange rate solution in two
ways. First, the exchange rate now depends on the unobserved future fundamental
ft+1 as agents trade based on their private signals about this future fundamental.
Second, the impact of the unobserved fundamental  t is now ampli￿ed as ￿  is
bigger than in the common knowledge model. This results from rational confu-
sion over what is driving the exchange rate. An increase in the risk-premium  t
on Foreign bonds leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency. But there
is a magni￿cation e￿ect under information heterogeneity.6 Agents do not know
whether the appreciation is a result of an increase in the risk-premium or it simply
due to more favorable private signals that others have about the future fundamen-
tal. As they give some weight to the second possibility, their expectation of ft+1
drops, leading to a further appreciation.
These results imply a stronger disconnect between the exchange rate and ob-
served fundamentals than under public information. They also imply that, con-
ditional on publicly observed information, the exchange rate contains information
6Rational confusion can also occur without heterogeneity, as in Takagi (1991) who assumes
that investors cannot distinguish between two fundamental shocks. However, there is no magni-
￿cation e￿ect in this case, as investors do not use the exchange rate as a source of information
on others’ signals.
11about future macro fundamentals. This is consistent with evidence reported by
Engel and West (2005) and Froot and Ramadorai (2005). These results become
even stronger when agents have private information about fundamentals further
into the future. The rational confusion then becomes persistent. Even when  t is
entirely transitory, a shock to  t will a￿ect the exchange rate for T periods when
agents have information about fundamentals T periods into the future.
This model can also explain the close relationship between order ￿ow and ex-
change rates. Evans and Lyons (2002), who ￿rst documented this relationship,
de￿ne order ￿ow as the \net of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders." The
initiator of a transaction is the trader who acts based on private information. The
close link between order ￿ow and exchange rates therefore suggests that most in-
formation is private. In the modern foreign exchange market, where almost all
trade is electronic, private information is mostly channeled through market orders.
In Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) we break the demand for Foreign bonds
into a component that only depends on private information and a component
that depends on public information and the exchange rate. The ￿rst component
of demand is submitted through market orders (order ￿ow), while the second
component is submitted through limit orders.7 We then show that the exchange
7This simple allocation between market and limit orders does not a￿ect the model’s equilib-
rium. The solution would become much more complex if private information in￿uenced limit
orders.
12rate is driven by (i) public information and (ii) order ￿ow. We show that the model
can generate a very close link between the exchange rate and order ￿ow as seen in
the data.
4 Model Uncertainty
The second deviation from the benchmark case consists in considering the impact
of model uncertainty, while going back to the assumption of common informa-
tion across all agents. Model uncertainty was ￿rst introduced into exchange rate
models in the late 1980s in order to explain the persistent expectational errors of
market participants about future exchange rates and to explain the high exchange
rate volatility. In the second half of the seventies and the eighties the dollar con-
sistently depreciated more than investors expected, while in the early 1980s it
appreciated more than investors expected. Contributions by Lewis (1989) and
Kaminsky (1993) showed that such persistent expectational errors can in fact be
perfectly rational when there is uncertainty about model parameters. Lewis (1989)
considers the standard monetary model, but assumes the existence of a one-time
change in the constant term of the money demand equation. By observing the
data, agents gradually learn about the new value of the constant term. Kaminsky
(1993) assumes that money growth is equal to a drift term plus a random innova-
tion. The drift term can switch between two values based on a Markov process. In
13both cases agents learn about the unknown parameters through Bayesian updating.
To illustrate the mechanism for such consistent expectational errors, assume
that the fundamental ft in our simple monetary model follows the process
￿ft = ￿ + ￿￿ft￿1 + vt (11)
Investors do not know ￿. They form Bayesian expectations by observing ￿ft,
starting with a prior belief ￿0. A large value of ￿ft can be the result of either a
high value of ￿ or a large draw of the transitory shock vt.
Now assume that ￿ increases, leading to a large value of ￿ft. Investors will
then increase their expectation of ￿, but not as much as the actual change in ￿ as
they give weight to the possibility that there is only a transitory increase in ￿ft
associated with vt. This means that actual future values of ￿f are larger than
investors expect. The exchange rate therefore depreciates more than investors
expect. This will continue as long as the expectation of ￿ by investors is below
the true value. Since the learning process is gradual, this can indeed last a long
time, leading to persistent expectational errors. Nonetheless, agents are perfectly
rational.
Tabellini (1988) emphasized that such a framework can lead to increased ex-
change rate volatility relative to the case where parameters are known. The logic
behind this is as follows. An increase in vt leads to an exchange rate deprecia-
tion. However, when ￿ is unknown, agents will increase their expectation of ￿,
14which raises the expectation of future levels of ￿f, which leads to an even larger
depreciation.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2011) emphasize a di￿erent implication of model
uncertainty. They show that it can lead to a highly unstable reduced form relation-
ship between the exchange rate and macro fundamentals even if the true structural
parameters are constant.8 This is driven by uncertainty about the level of parame-
ters that generates confusion about the interpretation of the data. We now develop
this point by introducing structural parameter uncertainty in the model.
Let us add money demand shocks ￿t and ￿￿
t to the money demand equations
(1) and (2) and de￿ne bt = ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t . Assume that these aggregate money demand
shocks are unobserved, so that bt is an unobserved macro fundamental. From
















t) + bt) (12)
Assume that agents do not know the value of the parameter ￿. They also do
not know the value of bt. However, through interest rates, money supplies, and
exchange rate they do learn the value of
￿(yt ￿ y
￿
t) + bt (13)
For illustrative purposes we make a couple of simplifying assumptions. First, we
8This instability, however, is not su￿cient to explain the Meese-Rogo￿ result. For a discussion,
see Bacchetta, van Wincoop and Beutler (2010).
15assume that mt￿m￿
t and yt￿y￿
t follow random walk processes. Second, we assume
that bt is i.i.d. with variance ￿2
b. Finally, we assume that starting in period 1 the
parameter ￿ is drawn from a distribution with mean ￿ ￿ and standard deviation ￿2
￿.
Agents can learn over time about the value of the parameter from the observation
of ￿(yt ￿ y￿
t) + bt.
Substituting the expression for the interest di￿erential (12) into (4), solving st
by integrating forward gives
st = (mt ￿ m
￿
t) ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿Et￿)(yt ￿ y
￿
t) + (1 ￿ ￿)bt (14)
This implies that the impact of the fundamental yt ￿ y￿




= ￿((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿Et￿) (15)
We can compare this to the case where ￿ is a known constant. From (6), setting
￿f = 1, the derivative is then ￿￿. As mentioned before, the discount rate ￿ is close
to 1. This implies that the impact of the fundamental yt￿y￿
t on the exchange rate
depends almost exclusively on the expectation of ￿ rather than ￿ itself.
The expectation of ￿ may bear very little relationship to the actual ￿. To see
this, we use Kalman ￿lter formulas to update expectations of ￿. Let pt be the
perceived variance of ￿ at time t. We start in period 1 with E1￿ = ￿ ￿ and p1 = ￿2
￿.
Subsequently the expectation and variance evolve according to
















￿t captures the speed of learning. In a more general example with multiple un-
known parameters and persistence of bt, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2011) show
that learning can be very slow. It may take more than a century for the variance
to be reduced by half.
The key equation is (18), which shows how the expectation of ￿ evolves over
time. If the last term on the right hand side is equal to zero, the expectation is a
weighted average of the expectation last period (with weight ￿t that is close to 1)
and the true parameter ￿. But it is the last term that is key here. It depends on
the product of yt￿y￿
t and bt. The expectation of the unknown parameter therefore
depends on the product of an observed and an unobserved fundamental.
How is this possible? The reason is another type of rational confusion, which we
refer to as a scapegoat e￿ect (see Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2004). Consider an
increase in the unobserved fundamental bt. Using information about interest rates
and the exchange rate, agents only know the aggregate of ￿￿(yt ￿y￿
t)+bt. When
bt is positive and (yt￿y￿
t) is positive, agents do not know whether ￿￿(yt￿y￿
t)+bt
is large because bt is large or the unknown parameter ￿ is low. They give at least
some weight to the latter possibility, therefore reducing the expectation of ￿, as
we can see formally from (18). Relative output becomes the scapegoat for what is
17really a shock to another, unobserved, fundamental.
The scapegoat e￿ect implies that the relationship between the exchange rate
and observed macro fundamentals can become highly unstable, and in a way that is
unrelated to time-variation in structural parameters themselves. In Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2011) we show that the expectation of the structural parameters can
move far away from the actual unknown structural parameters, both over short and
long horizons. This results in a very unstable reduced form relationship between
the exchange rate and macro fundamentals.
This ￿nding is consistent with survey evidence in the literature. Cheung and
Chinn (2001) conduct a survey of U.S. foreign exchange traders and ￿nd that the
weight that traders attach to di￿erent macro indicators varies considerably over
time. More recently Fratzscher, Sarno, and Zinna (2011) use 9 years of survey
data for 12 currencies to show that the weight that FX traders attach to di￿erent
macro fundamentals as determinants of exchange rates varies signi￿cantly over
time. They also show that these time-varying survey weights lead to time-variation
in the reduced form relationship between exchange rates and macro fundamentals.
Finally, they provide evidence of scapegoat e￿ects by showing that the survey
weights depend on the interaction of fundamentals and noise as in (18), using
order ￿ow data to measure the noise.9
9There is also some econometric evidence of parameter instability in reduced form exchange
rate equations. See Rossi (2006) and Sarno and Valente (2009).
185 Infrequent Decision Making
As discussed in Section 2, in most applications the UIP deviation in equation (4)
is a risk premium. Equating the expected excess return on Foreign bonds to a
risk premium follows from any portfolio Euler equation that represents a trade-o￿
between Home and Foreign bonds. It implicitly assumes that agents make new
portfolio decisions each period based on all available information. This assump-
tion, although entirely standard in the literature, is nonetheless a very strong and
not realistic one. It implicitly assumes that all traders actively manage their FX
exposure. Although there now exists an industry, developed in the late 1980s, that
actively manages FX exposure (hedge funds, currency overlay managers, leveraged
funds), it manages only a tiny fraction of cross-border ￿nancial holdings.10 Banks
themselves actively manage FX positions mostly intraday. Mutual funds are not
allowed by law to actively reallocate between Home and Foreign assets. A Eu-
rope fund is a Europe fund and cannot suddenly start investing in U.S. bonds.
Similarly, a global bond fund cannot suddenly start shorting one country’s bonds
when expected returns make this attractive. Moreover, Lyons (2001) reports that
￿nancial institutions rarely devote their own proprietary capital to currency strate-
gies. Finally, individual investors are well known to make very infrequent portfolio
decisions, especially regarding pension fund allocations.
10See Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) and Sager and Taylor (2006) for a discussion.
19In the models that we have discussed so far, we have assumed that (4) holds and
that agents reallocate their portfolio between Home and Foreign bonds each period
based on all available information. We now turn to the model in Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2010) where agents make infrequent portfolio decisions. Infrequent
decisions imply that information is only gradually incorporated into the exchange
rate. As initially argued by Froot and Thaler (1990) and Lyons (2001), the slow
incorporation of information leads to excess return predictability and could explain
the forward premium puzzle. The key aspect is not the frequency of trading, but
the frequency of portfolio decision making. There is a cost to active portfolio
management that makes it optimal for agents to take only infrequent portfolio
decisions. To capture this feature, the model assumes overlapping investors who
make a portfolio decision only in their ￿rst period. In subsequent periods investors
may trade to rebalance their portfolio, but they do not make any decisions on a
new portfolio as this is costly.
The model replaces (1)-(3), which connect the interest di￿erential to the ex-
change rate and some macro fundamentals, with a simple AR(1) process for the
interest di￿erential. This represents a gradually changing interest rate target. In
practice we set the Home interest rate equal to a constant r and let the Foreign
interest rate vary over time based on an AR process.11
11The constant Home interest rate is the result of an exogenous constant real interest rate of
r and a zero-in￿ation monetary policy in the Home country.
20The heart of the model is associated with equation (4), which now changes
as agents make infrequent portfolio decisions. Assume that there are overlapping
generations of agents who live T periods and who make one portfolio decision
for the next T periods when born. The portfolio decision involves the allocation
between Home and Foreign nominal bonds. Investors now care about the excess
return on Foreign bonds over the next T periods as they make one portfolio decision
for T periods. Let qt+k = st+k ￿ st+k￿1 + i￿
t+k￿1 ￿ it+k￿1 be the excess return on
Foreign bonds from t + k ￿ 1 to t + k. The excess return from t to t + T is then
qt;t+T = qt+1 + ::: + qt+T = st+T ￿ st ￿ fdt ￿ ::: ￿ fdt+T￿1, where fdt = it ￿ i￿
t is
the forward discount.
Agents only consume in the last period of life. Assuming a constant rate of
relative risk aversion ￿, the fraction allocated to the Foreign bond is
bt = ￿ b +
Et(qt;t+T)
￿￿2 (19)
where ￿ b is a constant and ￿2 depends on the risk associated with future excess
returns and is constant as well in equilibrium.12
Agents are born with wealth of 1, which accumulates over time due to returns






t+k￿j is the portfolio return from t + k ￿ j ￿ 1 to t + k ￿ j,
12The precise expression is ￿2 = (1 ￿ (1=￿))vart(qt;t+T) + (1=￿)
PT
k=1 vart(qt+k).
21which is equal to 1 + r + btqt+k￿j. Bond market equilibrium is represented by
T X
k=1
bt￿k+1Wt￿k+1;t + Xt = BSt (20)
Here Xt represents exogenous purchases of Foreign bonds by noise or liquidity
traders, which is calibrated to match observed exchange rate volatility and the
well-known near-random walk behavior of the exchange rate. The supply of bonds
is on the right hand side. The Foreign bond supply is ￿xed at B in Foreign currency,
which translates to BSt in the Home currency.
The model is solved by substituting the expressions for the optimal portfolios
and wealth and then log-linearizing. This leads to a complicated di￿erence equa-
tion in the exchange rate that is solved numerically. The only stochastic driver is
the forward discount, which follows an AR process.
The model can account for the forward discount puzzle. The basic logic is
very simple. Consider an increase in the Foreign interest rate. This leads to
an increased demand for Foreign bonds, causing an appreciation of the Foreign
currency. However, as agents adjust their portfolios gradually (simpli￿ed in the
model through the OLG structure), there is a continued shift towards Foreign
bonds that leads to a steady appreciation of the Foreign currency. This accounts
for the well-established stylized fact that high interest rate currencies tend to
appreciate (the forward discount or Fama puzzle). It is also consistent with the
evidence in presented Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) that after an interest rate
22increase a currency continues to appreciate for 8 to 12 quarters before it starts to
depreciate.
Four comments are worth making about this result. First, there is the question
of who sells the Foreign bonds when agents continue to shift their portfolio to
Foreign bonds. The answer is that the \inactive" agents at any point in time,
which account for a fraction (T ￿ 1)=T of all agents, automatically take the other
side through portfolio rebalancing. As the Foreign currency appreciates, these
inactive agents sell Foreign bonds in order to rebalance their portfolios. Notice
that this does not involve a new portfolio decision. They simply sell to keep the
portfolio share allocated to Foreign bonds constant.
Second, there is the question of whether making infrequent portfolio decisions is
optimal. Of course, if there is no cost to portfolio decision making, all agents would
actively manage their portfolios at all times. However, the industry that actively
manages FX positions charges steep fees for their services. The fees depend on
the risk of the fund. At 20% risk (standard deviation of return), a typical fee is
a one percent management fee plus 20% of pro￿ts, which in practice amounts to
about 4%. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) ￿nd that at such fees it is indeed
optimal for agents to not actively manage their portfolios. While active portfolio
management leads to higher expected portfolio returns, it also involves considerable
risk as future exchange rates are hard to predict. As a result, the welfare gains
23from active management are not su￿cient to o￿set the fees charged.
Third, an important question is how these results change when we allow for
many currencies. Diversi￿cation of the portfolio across many currencies can re-
duce the overall risk exposure, which can make active FX portfolio management
optimal. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) consider an extension calibrated to 6
countries (5 currencies). As the risk is now diminished, it indeed becomes optimal
for investors to actively manage their portfolio. However, as some agents start
to actively manage their portfolio and therefore actively exploit expected excess
return opportunities, in equilibrium these expected excess returns become smaller.
This in turn makes it less attractive to actively manage portfolios. There is then an
equilibrium that is such that the gain from active portfolio management is exactly
equal its cost and only a small fraction of agents actively manages their portfolio,
as seen in the data. At the same time the calibration shows that the excess return
predictability in equilibrium corresponds closely to that seen in the data.
Finally, there might be another source of incomplete information processing
in addition to infrequent decisions. When investors change their portfolio, they
may do this based on a limited set of information. Investors may simply observe
the interest di￿erential, as with carry trade, and invest in the high interest rate
currency. Alternatively investors may simply assume that the exchange rate follows
a random walk. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) introduce these assumptions in
24the context of infrequent trading and show that the model generates an even more
negative coe￿cient in the Fama regression. In Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2007),
we focus on the random walk hypothesis in forming exchange rate expectations. We
show that with active trading such an assumption leads to strongly counterfactual
positive Fama coe￿cients. However, with infrequent trading the model can match
the data.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed the implications of various forms of incomplete in-
formation in an otherwise standard model of exchange rate determination. Devia-
tions from the complete information paradigm allow us to explain various exchange
rate puzzles, such as the disconnect between exchange rates and fundamentals and
the forward premium puzzle.
The focus of this chapter is mainly in￿uenced by our previous research and
does not represent an exhaustive review of the existing literature. While we have
examined incomplete information in versions of the standard monetary model,
some papers have examined this issue in alternative models. For example, Roberts
(1995) assumes imperfect information on the persistence of a shock in a dynamic
Mundell-Fleming model. However, a reduced-form approach is more di￿cult to
interpret as learning is not based on optimal inference. Martinez-Garc￿ ￿a (2010)
25introduces imperfect information in a DSGE model. He shows that consumption
reacts less to shocks. This can explain that relative consumption is less volatile
than exchange rates, i.e. the well-known Backus-Smith puzzle.
We have also restricted our discussion to rational expectations frameworks.
An entirely di￿erent direction is to consider deviations from rational expectations,
where expectations are typically based on rules that ignore all or part of the in-
formation from the model. In particular, models of adaptive learning have been
applied to exchange rates in many papers (e.g. Chakraborty and Evans, 2008,
Lewis and Markiewicz, 2009). Often in these analyses there is no structural model
uncertainty and recursive learning schemes converge to rational expectations equi-
libria. In contrast, Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) consider a model where agents
have incorrect beliefs about the process of the interest rate and never learn. Other
models introduce more exogenous expectational rules, such as Mark and Wu (1998)
and the well-known model by Frankel and Froot (1988) of chartists and fundamen-
talists (see also De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005). Goldberg and Frydman (1996)
assume imperfect knowledge of the underlying model, so that agents use the rel-
evant variables but ignore the model’s structure and thus the precise weights of
each variable. These types of models have been used to account for a wide range of
exchange rate features, such as the exchange rate disconnect, high exchange rate
volatility, persistent expectational errors, and the forward discount puzzle.
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